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1.   Introduction
The corporate governance reforms, which commenced in 1997, introduced several new 
governance features in Japanese corporations. Among them, introduction of outside directors 
and the establishment of the three-committee system (i.e., an audit committee, remuneration 
committee and nomination committee) are observed to be two prominent features. The 
revised Commercial Code (2002) of Japan specifies that the majority of such committees need 
to be deployed with outside directors. The Code, however, does not indicate a requirement on 
the expertise of the outside directors thus deployed.
Apart from other benefits, extant conceptual and empirical research studies indicate an 
enhanced financial reporting function of an entity via the engagement of outside directors. 
They indicate that it is due to the element of independence, which results in effective 
monitoring of the accounting and internal control system, especially in the presence of an audit 
committee. Furthermore, strong empirical evidence support that the accounting expertise 
within such audit committees leads to higher financial reporting integrity, inclusive of better 
earnings quality. The combination among accounting expertise, independence (i.e., being an 
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outside director) and authority to influence directly on the financial reporting monitoring 
function via an audit committee is believed to enhance effectively the financial reporting 
function and thereby the increment in the earnings quality of a firm.
Extant empirical research studies in the Japanese context have concentrated in 
evaluating the afore-mentioned corporate governance reforms in terms of corporate 
performance (Saito, 2009; Bebenrotha, 2007). Contemporary local studies in the financial 
accounting discipline are scarce and provide mixed evidence. Hence, this research study 
investigates the association between the accounting expertise of outside directors with an 
important accounting dimension: earnings quality, in the context of the firms that had adopted 
the committee system. Earnings is one of the key criterion in financial accounting that is 
widely used to make informed economic decisions by stakeholders, and therefore the quality 
of earnings is observed to be of paramount importance.[1] 
Concerning the earnings quality proxies, well-established accruals quality proxies are 
used to operationalize the core construct of earnings quality in this study as per the extant 
literature. The model proposed in Dechow and Dichev (2002) and further expanded by 
McNichols (2002), and the Modified Jones Model (Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney, 1995) are thus 
used. In order to proxy accounting expertise of outside directors, their experience in the 
accounting field is used in pursuant to extant studies. As the sample, this research study uses 
firms listed in Tokyo Stock Exchange (First and Second sections), that have implemented the 
committees system for the sample period of 2006 to 2008. 
In terms of the findings, the main multivariate regression analysis supports the expected 
positive association between earnings quality proxied by Modified Jones Model and presence 
of outside directors possessing accounting expertise for firms that had adopted the committee 
system. On the other hand, only a weak positive association is observed between them, when 
earnings quality is measured using the expanded version of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model. In other words, these findings may suggest that the presence of outside directors 
possessing accounting expertise is more effective in enhancing earnings quality by reducing 
earnings management (i.e., reducing discretionary accruals) than by improving overall 
accruals quality (i.e., by the reduction of the mapping errors). Nevertheless, the significance 
levels of these relations are observed to be quite low. In contrast, in the international context, 
Lin and Hwang (2010), in their meta-analysis, indicate that the relations are positive and highly 
significant (p<0.01). On the other hand, despite using a different methodology and sample, but 
the only study that has some similarities with the current study in the Japanese context, 
Ebihara and Ajward (2010) find mixed evidence on the relation between outside directors 
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having accounting expertise and earnings quality proxies (i.e., accruals and cash flow 
predictability based proxies). Furthermore, in local extant studies (Saito, 2009; Bebenrotha & 
Donghaob, 2007) using corporate performance proxies (in contrast to earnings quality proxies 
used in this study), however, it is indicated that in overall, the selected corporate governance 
aspects (in this paper) more or less have a significant positive influence over corporate 
performance. In exploring the reasons for the lesser statistical significance observed in this 
study, the inability to function effectively as monitors on more sophisticated financial 
accounting dimensions (i.e., internal control system) by the outside directors (even having 
accounting expertise) that enhances earnings quality in a highly relational corporate 
environment; the possibility that the objective and functions of the establishment and 
operation of audit committees differ from their Anglo-American counterparts, are inferred to 
be key possibilities. Due to these reasons and inherently restricted sample, future in-depth 
case study nature of research is encouraged.
While having adopted unique features in the research design, this study is also expected 
to contribute to the scarce accounting literature that evaluates the contemporary governance 
reforms in terms of accounting bases in the Japanese corporate context. As per implications, 
this research may raise possible concerns over issues as the establishment of audit 
committees and deployment of outside directors with appropriate expertise. The genuine 
objective of the establishment of the audit committees and the idea of directors being merely 
“independent” needs to be taken into consideration, especially as the Commercial Code does 
not specify any expertise requirement to be engaged as an outside director.
The remaining sections are organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the 
contemporary corporate governance reforms in Japan, and discusses extant literature on 
relations between earnings quality of a firm and aspects such as outside directors, expertise of 
them and existence of audit committees. Further, based on this discussion, the main 
hypothesis tested under this research is specified under Section 2. In Section 3, the research 
methodology is elaborated, and the findings gained via this methodology are detailed in 
Section 4 with an accompanying discussion. While Section 5 indicates the results and related 
discussion of the additional analyses, Section 6 summarizes the conclusions derived under this 
study and cites future research directions. 
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2.   Literature Survey
2.1 Contemporary Corporate Governance Reforms in Japan
In 1997, Sony was the first to introduce outside directors into its board, which is one of 
the prominent features of the US style board system (Yoshikawa, Tsui-Auch & McGuire, 2007; 
Saito, 2009). Hirata (2004) and Saito (2009) further indicate that such governance reforms 
movement begun in 1997 due to deteriorating corporate performance, increase in corporate 
scandals and less effective traditional governance systems. As an important milestone in these 
governance reforms, in 2002, the Commercial Code of Japan was amended recognizing the 
three committee system (i.e., audit committee, remuneration committee and nomination 
committee) –hereafter referred as the committee system in this study–, which is also a key 
feature of the Anglo-American model of corporate governance. 
 
2.2 Relation between Independence, Expertise and Existence of Audit Committee 
with Earnings Quality 
In general, extant conceptual and empirical literature supports that existence of audit 
committees leads to the improvement in the financial reporting quality as well as earnings 
quality (Blue Ribbon Committee, 1999; He et al., 2008; Baxter & Cotter, 2009). These studies 
indicate that an audit committee leads to the improvement in the audit quality as well as more 
importantly the financial reporting function. They explain that these benefits are achieved 
through the oversight and monitoring of dimensions such as the proper functioning of the 
accounting and internal control systems, the functioning of the internal auditors, the external 
auditing process, as well as its liaison between the external auditor and the management. 
Based on the meta analysis of Lin and Hwang (2010), however, it is apparent that the mere 
existence of an audit committee, itself does not guarantee the expected benefits. Based on the 
findings using Japanese data, the author also could not establish a strong positive association 
between the existences of audit committees per se with the construct of quality of earnings 
(Ajward, 2011). Further, in that study, the author also did not find a strong positive association 
between the outside directors and earnings quality as well. 
On the other hand, in the international context, the meta-analysis in Lin & Hwang (2010) 
indicates that independence of the audit committee members as well as relevant financial 
expertise of audit committees, respectively, are strongly positively associated with earnings 
quality. Therefore, based on the results of the meta-analysis of Lin & Hwang (2010), it could 
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be strongly argued that audit committees having members who are independent (i.e., outside 
directors) and possessing accounting expertise (at the same time) are strongly positively 
associated with earnings quality.
This research introduces a number of improvements in its research design that 
distinguishes from contemporary extant research. One of the main concerns in the existing 
research studies is that they consider the accounting expertise of outside directors only within 
the audit committees itself, in evaluating the influence of it on earnings quality. In reality, 
however, any outside director in the board, who is having the due accounting expertise could 
contribute to the key decisions made by the board. Since an audit committee is the committee 
that makes recommendations to the board on audit and financial accounting issues, outside 
directors within the audit committee as well as other outside directors (in the board) who are 
having the due accounting expertise could use the audit committee to strongly influence the 
board decisions. Therefore, to overcome this concern in extant research, under this study, 
outside directors possessing accounting expertise in the audit committee itself as well as in 
the board as a whole are considered. Apart from this improvement in the research design, this 
study uses alternative earnings quality proxies as well as additional sensitivity tests on 
resolving issues such as endogeneity and reverse causality to establish the robustness of the 
findings. These features are expected to enhance the uniqueness of this study, while 
contributing to the limited local extant literature. Accordingly, in this study, an attempt is 
made to empirically investigate whether the accounting expertise of outside directors leads to 
superior earnings quality for firms that have adopted the committee system.[2]
2.3 Research Hypothesis
Based on the discussions in the preceding section, it could be expected that firms (that 
have implemented the committee system) having outside directors possessing accounting 
expertise (in the audit committee as well as in the board) is expected to have superior 
earnings quality.[2] This was explained as due to the effective monitoring of the financial 
reporting function espoused through their accounting expertise and independence. H1 
expresses this empirical prediction in the form of a hypothesis as follows:
H1:  Firms having outside directors with accounting expertise (in the audit committee as 
well as in the board) have superior earnings quality on a statistically significant basis.
Section 3 below elaborates the research design that is suggested to test the above 
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hypothesis.
3.   Research Design
3.1  Data and Sample 
Nikkei NEEDS FinancialQuest database (published by the Nikkei Digital Media, Inc.) 
was used to extract financial statement data, while NEEDS-Cges (Nikkei Economic Electronic 
Databank System - Corporate Governance Evaluation System) database (published by Nikkei 
Digital Media, Inc.) was used to obtain the corporate governance related information. The 
accounting experience of outside directors (used to proxy their expertise in accounting, see 
Section 3.2.3), which had been accumulated via a tedious manual process by visiting online 
public profiles and other sources for each individual outside director, was secured by the 
author from a prominent researcher in the field.[3] 
The sample consists of firms listed in Tokyo Stock Exchange (First and Second 
sections), and the research period under consideration for this study is 2006 to 2008 (banking, 
insurance and financial firms are excluded due to significant differences in their financial 
statements, as per the extant literature). After screening for data availability on governance 
information and financial data, the sample is reduced from the total of 169 firm-years (as per 
the NEEDS-Cges database) to 91 firm-years for the sample used in the analysis pertaining to 
the expanded version of the Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) Model, and to 92 firm-years for the 
analysis related to the Modified Jones Model.[4]
3.2 Definitions and Measurements
3.2.1 Accruals and estimation
In financial accounting, accruals are defined as the difference between earnings and the 
operating cash flows. Hribar and Collins (2002) indicate that empirical research studies have 
followed two approaches in estimating accounting accruals as:
a.   Indirect balance sheet approach:
Under this approach, balance sheet elements are used in ascertaining the accruals. This 
research uses the balance sheet approach to estimate the short-term accruals as follows (see 
Ebihara et al., 2010):
Short-term Accruals/Change in Working Capital (denoted as ΔWC [5] in this paper): 
ΔCurrent assets – ΔCash& deposits – ΔShort-term investment securities – ΔShort-term loans 
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receivable – (ΔCurrent liabilities  – ΔShort-term loans payable – ΔCommercial papers – 
ΔCurrent portion of the long-term loans payable – ΔCurrent portion of the bonds and 
convertible bonds)
(Δ is the change in a selected accounting element from period t–1 to period t.)
b.   Direct cash flow statement approach:
Under this approach, the difference between the earnings and operating cash flows 
indicated in the cash flow statement is used to estimate the total accruals. Despite majority of 
studies uses the indirect approach, Hribar and Collins (2002) elaborate that the indirect 
approach suffers from an articulation problem between changes in balance sheet working 
capital accounts and the accrual elements of revenue and expenses of the income statement. In 
order to avoid this issue, in this research, the total accruals (denoted in this paper as: TACC [5]) 
are estimated using the direct cash flow statement approach, which is the difference between 
earnings (adjusted for extraordinary items) and operating cash flows.
3.2.2 Earnings quality and related measures
Dechow, Ge and Schrand (2010) view that higher quality earnings provide more 
information of the features of the financial performance of a firm that is relevant to a specific 
decision-maker in making a specific decision. As per this definition, it is apparent that “earnings 
quality” is defined in the context of a particular decision context. In this research, proxies that 
are based on accounting accruals are used to proxy earnings quality due to being an often 
used criterion in similar extant research (Baxter & Cotter, 2009; Dhaliwal, Naiker & Navissi, 
2006). Findings of Sloan (1996) indicate that accounting accruals do have value relevance, and 
this phenomenon could be applied to the definition of Dechow, Ge and Schrand (2010) of 
earnings quality introduced above. Accordingly, it could be argued that higher quality of 
accounting accruals provide more information on the financial performance of an entity in 
making more informed investment decisions (i.e., the relevant decision context) by investors. 
In this research, two well-accepted accounting accruals based proxy models are used to 
operationalize earnings quality, which are often used in similar contemporary studies and are 
discussed next.
Dechow and Dichev (2002) introduce a model that measures the mapping errors 
between the amounts accrued and the amounts realized (see Eqn. a below) and develop a 
proxy measure to represent the short-term accruals quality. 
Accounting Expertise of Outside Directors and Earnings Quality within the Context of the Committee System: An Empirical Analysis
— 212 —
 ΔWCt = α  + β 1CFOt-1 + β 2CFOt + β 3CFOt+1 + ε t Eqn. a
where: [5]
ΔWC:  is the change in the working capital (i.e., short-term accruals) from the period t–1 
to the period t (see Section 3.2.1).
CFO:  is the operating cash flow of the firm. Subscripts in the CFO denotations are as 
follows: t: current period’s operating cash flow; t-1: previous period’s operating cash 
flow; t+1: next period’s operating cash flow.
McNichols (2002) illustrates, however, that one of the concerns in the D&D Model is 
that it concentrates only on short-term accruals and does not consider long-term accruals in 
estimating the mapping error between accruals and their realizations. Therefore, he modifies 
the model (Eqn. a) by introducing components from the Jones (1991) model and illustrates 
that the modified version addresses the above concern by considering the total accruals. 
Therefore, the robust specification (see Eqn. b below) of Francis et al. (2005), which is based 
on the modifications suggested by McNichols (2002) is used in this research –referred as 
Expanded D&D Model in this paper– as the first accruals-based proxy to operationalize 
earnings quality. 
 ΔWCt = α 0 + β 1CFOt-1 + β 2CFOt + β 3CFOt+1 + β 4ΔREVt + β 5PPEt + ε t Eqn. b
where: [5]
ΔREV: is the change in sales from the period t-1 to t.
PPE:  is the property, plant, and equipment, which is measured at net book value at 
period t.
Accordingly, a cross-sectional version of the Expanded D&D Model is used on a firm 
specific basis.[6] For this purpose, Eqn. b above was first regressed on a sector specific basis 
for each period, and the coefficients secured via this procedure was fitted into equation Eqn. 
b(2) indicated below.[7] The absolute value of the value thus obtained on a firm-specific basis 
(which is hereafter denoted as: AbsExD&D) is used as the first proxy measures of accruals 
quality in this research to operationalize earnings quality.[8]
 AbsExD&Dt = ΔWCt – (α0 + β
∧
1CFOt-1 + β
∧
2CFOt + β
∧
3CFOt+1 + β4ΔREVt + β5PPEt + εt ) Eqn. b(2)
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It should be noted that the Expanded D&D Model (discussed above) measures the 
overall variability of the accruals, and on the other hand, the Modified Jones Model (Dechow, 
Sloan & Sweeney, 1995) measures specifically the discretionary accruals (thus earnings 
management). Accordingly, the cross-sectional version of the Modified Jones Model (see Eqn. 
c below) is used as an alternative proxy measure in this study. [6] [7]
 TACCt = α 0 + β 1Δ ADJREVt + β 2PPEt + ε t Eqn. c
where: [5]
TACC: is the total accruals for period t (see Section 3.2.1).
ΔADJREV:  is the difference in changes in sales and accounts receivable from period t-1 
to t.
PPE:  is the property, plant, and equipment, which is measured at net book value at 
period t.
First, in estimating non-discretionary accruals, Eqn. c above was regressed on a cross 
sectional basis under each period, and the coefficients thus obtained were fitted to Eqn. c to 
calculate non-discretionary accruals (which are denoted as NDAJ) on a firm-specific basis. 
Then the discretionary accruals were estimated using Eqn. c(2) below:
 DACJt = TACCt - NDAJt Eqn. c(2)
where: [5]
DACJ: is the discretionary accruals for period t.
TACC: is the total accruals for period t (see Section 3.2.1).
NDAJ: is the non-discretionary accruals for period t.
The absolute value of the discretionary accruals (herein forth denoted as: AbsDACJ) is 
used as the second proxy measure in this study as an alternative operationalization of earnings 
quality.[8]
It should be noted that, under both of the above proxies (AbsExD&D and AbsDACJ), 
higher magnitudes represent poor quality of earnings as higher AbsExD&D connote higher 
mapping errors and higher AbsDACJ signifies higher discretionary accruals (i.e., increased 
earnings management). The dual operationalization is expected to provide higher robustness 
in the findings of this study.
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3.2.3 Accounting expertise and measure
In accordance with the extant literature (Mustafa & Youssef, 2010; Dhaliwal, Naiker & 
Navissi, 2006), the expertise of outside directors is proxied using the experience of the 
respective outside director. Under this study, experience in the accounting field of outside 
directors is used to proxy their accounting expertise (denoted as AccExDum in Section 3.3).[9] 
Accounting experience of outside directors includes experience as accountants, members of 
audit firms, members of Auditor's Association, and academic researchers in accounting.
The next section elaborates the research strategy proposed and used under this study.
3.3 Research Strategy
In order to test the hypothesis indicated under Section 2.3, as per the extant literature, 
an ordinary least squares (OLS) multivariate regression model is suggested and used under 
this study for the main analysis by pooling the data. Accordingly, all firm year observations 
identified under Section 3.1 are used that pertains to the period 2006-2008. The model thus 
proposed is depicted as follows Eqn. 1:[2] [10]
EQt =  α 0 +  α 1AccExDumt +  α 2LnTAt +  α 3EBEIt +  α 4Levert +  α 5LossDumt + 
α 6ToBRDt + α 7ToOutRtot + α 8AcOutRtot + α 9AcToDirt + α 10FrgnRtot + α 11EmpRtot  
+ α 12MbRtot + Σγ iSecDumi,t +  ΣδnYrDumn,t + ε t Eqn. 1
where:
EQ:  Represents the both the alternative earnings quality proxy measures: AbsExD&D 
(absolute value of the Expanded D&D Model based proxy measure) and AbsDACJ 
(absolute value of the discretionary accruals estimated based on the Modified Jones 
Model) for the period t, respectively, which were defined and operationalized under 
Section 3.2.2. 
AccExDum: Denotes the accounting expertise dummy variable of outside directors in the 
board (Section 3.2.3). In this dummy variable, “0” represents the non-existence of 
outside director with accounting expertise (neither in a committee nor in the board 
as a whole) and “1” indicates the presence of at least one outside director with 
accounting expertise (either in a committee or the board as a whole), for period t.[11]
LnTA: is the natural logarithm of the average total assets of the firm for period t.[12]
EBEI: is the net income adjusted for extra ordinary items for period t.[5]
Lever:  is the financial leverage, which is defined as total liabilities at period t divided by 
total assets at period t.
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LossDum:  is the dummy variable representing a loss (i.e., negative EBEI) during period 
t. “0” represents the absence of negative EBEI, while “1” denote the presence 
of negative EBEI for the period t.  
ToBRD: is the total number of directors in the board of directors at period t.
ToOutRto:  is the outside director ratio (expressed in percentage) at the period t, 
calculated as the total outside directors in the board divided by total directors 
in the board of directors.
AcOutRto:  is the ratio (expressed in percentage) between outside directors in the audit 
committee and total directors in the audit committee at period t.
AcToDir: is the total number of directors in the audit committee at period t.
FrgnRto: is the foreign ownership in equity (ratio) expressed in percentage at period t. 
EmpRto:  represents the ownership by employees in equity (ratio expressed in 
percentage) at period t. 
MbRto:  denotes the combined ownership in equity (ratio) by the first and second main 
banks of the respective firm at period t (expressed in percentage).
Σγ iSecDumi,t: denotes the sector dummy at period t.
ΣδnYrDumn,t: denotes the period dummy.
Under Section 2.3, it is hypothesized (H1) that firms having outside directors with 
accounting expertise (in the audit committees as well as within the board) have superior 
earnings quality for firms that had implemented the committee system. Accordingly, in the 
above regression model specification (i.e., Eqn. 1), a negative sign connoting a positive 
relation is empirically predicted between the alternative earnings quality measures (i.e., 
AbsExD&D and AbsDACJ) and the main dummy variable: AccExDum (i.e., the presence of 
outside directors with accounting expertise), respectively.[13]
The findings of the research are elaborated in the next section that uses the research 
strategies proposed in this section.
4.   Findings and Discussion
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A and Panel B of Table 1 depicts the descriptive statistics based on the firm-years 
used under the Expanded D&D Model sample and the Modified Jones Model sample, 
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respectively (Section 3.1). AccExDum (dummy) variable indicates the existence of at least one 
outside director with accounting expertise in the board. Other variables consist of financial 
variables and the governance related variables, which were denoted in Section 3.2 and Section 
3.3.[5]
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A
Descriptive statistics for the Expanded D&D Model sample (n=91)
Variable Mean SD 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile
AccExDum 0.2308 0.4237 　 　 　
LnTA 12.0474 1.5037 10.7939 12.2247 13.1384
EBEI 0.0276 0.0665 0.0226 0.0417 0.0565
Lever 0.5175 0.2051 0.3719 0.5343 0.6665
CFO 0.0511 0.0652 0.0357 0.0590 0.0854
TACC -0.0293 0.1007 -0.0545 -0.0236 0.0037
CACC 0.0117 0.0891 -0.0114 0.0093 0.0386
LossDum 0.1429 0.3519 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
AbsExD&D 0.0271 0.0214 0.0073 0.0227 0.0462
ToBRD 8.4945 2.4284 7.0000 8.0000 11.0000
ToOutRto 48.5507 12.7104 37.5000 42.8571 60.0000
AcToDir 3.7253 0.9553 3.0000 3.0000 4.0000
AcOutRto 75.9812 14.7981 66.6667 66.6667 100.0000
FrgnRto 21.3022 14.4444 11.2200 18.8400 26.9500
EmpRto 0.9393 1.0075 0.0000 0.6600 1.4700
MbRto 1.5116 2.4065 0.0000 0.0000 1.9500
Panel B
Descriptive statistics for the Modified Jones Model sample (n=92)
Variable Mean SD 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile
AccExDum 0.2283 0.4220 　 　 　
LnTA 12.0438 1.4958 10.8122 12.2161 13.1229
EBEI 0.0281 0.0663 0.0227 0.0419 0.0575
Lever 0.5154 0.2050 0.3699 0.5319 0.6636
CFO 0.0517 0.0651 0.0359 0.0607 0.0868
TACC -0.0292 0.1001 -0.0537 -0.0228 0.0032
CACC 0.1413 0.3502 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
LossDum 0.0120 0.0886 -0.0111 0.0094 0.0389
AbsExD&D 0.0398 0.0353 0.0116 0.0270 0.0614
ToBRD 8.5000 2.4156 7.0000 8.0000 10.5000
ToOutRto 48.5060 12.6476 37.5000 42.8571 60.0000
AcToDir 3.7283 0.9505 3.0000 3.0000 4.0000
AcOutRto 75.9705 14.7169 66.6667 66.6667 90.0000
FrgnRto 21.5497 14.5596 11.3600 19.2350 27.1800
EmpRto 0.9291 1.0067 0.0000 0.6550 1.4450
MbRto 1.4952 2.3984 0.0000 0.0000 1.9350
This table depicts the descriptive statistics for both Expanded D&D Model sample (Panel A) and Modified Jones 
Model sample (Panel B). The denotations of the variables are indicated in Section 3.2 and 3.3. 
n represents the firm year observations under each sample.
AccExDum (dummy) variable indicates that on average, 23% of both samples consist of 
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firm-years having at least one outside director with accounting expertise. The standard 
deviation and median values of the variable that depicts the size of a firm (LnTA: natural 
logarithm of average total assets) indicate that the samples are not affected by extreme 
variations.[14]  
In terms of the governance variables, it could be clearly observed in Table 1 that due to 
the provisions of the Commercial Code, which requires outside directors should be the 
majority in the audit committees (as well as other two committees), the variable that denotes 
the audit committee outside director ratio (AcOutRto) is approximately 67% (see 1st Quartile). 
Further, this ratio is observed to be higher than the entire board’s outside director ratio 
(ToOutRto). Moreover, confirming the minimum requirements of the Commercial Code, the 
average number of directors in an audit committee consists of three members. It is also 
interesting to note that the foreign ownership in equity (FrgnRto) is approximately 21% in the 
firms that have adopted the Anglo-American committee system. 
In terms of the findings of the univariate analysis, the Pearson’s correlation matrices for 
both Expanded D&D Model sample and Modified Jones Model sample are depicted in Table 2 
and Table 3, respectively. 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix for Expanded D&D Model sample
Exp. 
Sign AbsExD&D AccExDum TACC CACC LnTA EBEI CFO Lever LossDum ToBRD ToOutRto AcOutRto AcToRto FrgnRto EmpRto MbRto
AbsExD&D 1
AccExDum – -0.0104 1
TACC ? 0.0093 0.0884 1
CACC ? -0.0713 0.1820 0.4464** 1
LnTA ? -0.0275 0.0746 0.0403 0.0052 1
EBEI ? 0.0125 0.1030 0.4117** 0.3202** 0.1950 1
CFO ? 0.0055 0.0352 -0.3705** -0.0263 0.1670 0.6939** 1
Lever ? 0.2760** 0.2971** 0.1550 -0.0360 0.4826** 0.2417* 0.1240 1
LossDum ? 0.2781** 0.0745 -0.3180** -0.2970** -0.2072* -0.7427** -0.5057** -0.0985 1
ToBRD ? -0.0274 0.6222** 0.0755 0.0440 0.2669* 0.2292* 0.1740 0.2812** 0.0464 1
ToOutRto – 0.2350* 0.1470 -0.1550 -0.1860 -0.3010** -0.4337** -0.3192** -0.0762 0.4168** -0.1910 1
AcOutRto – -0.0567 0.2087* 0.1510 -0.0560 -0.2085* -0.2840** -0.4085** 0.0455 0.2228* 0.0416 0.4303** 1
AcToDir ? -0.1480 0.1580 -0.0174 -0.0387 0.1870 0.0722 0.0873 -0.0428 0.1180 0.6148** -0.1220 0.0333 1
FrgnRto – 0.1090 0.2501* -0.3304** -0.2153* 0.1700 -0.3109** -0.0558 0.1780 0.3484** 0.4201** 0.2060 0.1890 0.2895** 1
EmpRto – -0.3218** -0.0288 0.1170 0.0469 -0.0348 0.2010 0.1120 -0.2784** -0.1840 0.0226 -0.3422** -0.2476* 0.0505 -0.3177** 1
MbRto – -0.1550 0.1340 -0.0870 -0.0846 0.1380 0.1560 0.2281* 0.1350 -0.1020 0.1490 -0.2020 -0.1590 -0.0786 -0.0207 0.3960** 1
Pearson’s correlation coefficients are depicted. Denotations of the variables are stated in Section 3.2 and 3.3. 
* Significant at 5%   ** Significant at 1%
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix for the Modified Jones Model sample
Exp. 
Sign AbsExD&D AccExDum TACC CACC LnTA EBEI CFO Lever LossDum ToBRD ToOutRto AcOutRto AcToRto FrgnRto EmpRto MbRto
AbsExD&D 1
AccExDum – 0.0681 1
TACC ? -0.1190 0.0890 1
CACC ? -0.1070 0.1790 0.4457** 1
LnTA ? 0.0272 0.0758 0.0405 0.0045 1
EBEI ? 0.0391 0.0985 0.4096** 0.3215** 0.1930 1
CFO ? 0.1340 0.0302 -0.3702** -0.0235 0.1650 0.6958** 1
Lever ? 0.3267** 0.3008** 0.1550 -0.0390 0.4823** 0.2325* 0.1150 1
LossDum ? 0.1680 0.0768 -0.3172** -0.2980** -0.2059* -0.7432** -0.5071** -0.0937 1
ToBRD ? 0.1510 0.6198** 0.0752 0.0447 0.2663* 0.2301* 0.1750 0.2776** 0.0455 1
ToOutRto – 0.1430 0.1490 -0.1550 -0.1870 -0.2999** -0.4347** -0.3208** -0.0724 0.4176** -0.1910 1
AcOutRto – -0.0977 0.2087* 0.1510 -0.0561 -0.2083* -0.2837** -0.4076** 0.0460 0.2228* 0.0415 0.4302** 1
AcToDir ? -0.0025 0.1560 -0.0177 -0.0376 0.1860 0.0742 0.0895 -0.0456 0.1170 0.6150** -0.1230 0.0331 1
FrgnRto – 0.2020 0.2370* -0.3280** -0.2070* 0.1640 -0.2939** -0.0411 0.1580 0.3365** 0.4179** 0.1980 0.1850 0.2904** 1
EmpRto – -0.2020 -0.0231 0.1180 0.0435 -0.0323 0.1930 0.1030 -0.2661* -0.1780 0.0203 -0.3371** -0.2458* 0.0473 -0.3278** 1
MbRto – -0.0417 0.1370 -0.0860 -0.0865 0.1390 0.1510 0.2212* 0.1410 -0.0993 0.1470 -0.1990 -0.1590 -0.0804 -0.0311 0.3997** 1
Pearson’s correlation coefficients are depicted. Denotations of the variables are stated in Section 3.2 and 3.3. 
* Significant at 5%  ** Significant at 1%
On a univariate basis, Table 2 indicates the expected negative sign in the relation 
between accounting expertise (AccExDum) and the Expanded D&D Model based earnings 
quality measure (AbsExD&D).[13] In contrast, an unexpected positive sign is observed in Table 
3 between AccExDum variable and Modified Jones Model based earnings quality measure 
(AbsDACJ) on a univariate basis.[15] In both instances, statistical significance is not observed, 
however. It is interesting to note that, on a univariate basis, there is a significant unexpected 
positive association between the total board outside directors ratio (ToOutRto) with 
AbsExD&D. It also observed that audit committee outside directors ratio (AcOutRto) as well as 
the audit committee total directors variable (AcToDir) are having the expected negative sign 
in the relation with both earnings quality measures (not significant, however). Finally, it is 
noted that under both samples, employee ownership (EmpRto) and combined main bank 
ownership (MbRto) variables are having the expected negative signs (only under the 
Expanded D&D Model sample, however, a significant negative association is observed for 
EmpRto and AbsExD&D). The results presented in this section are on a univariate basis, and 
the next section presents findings on a multivariate basis in which possible alternative 
explanations are controlled for.
4.2 Multivariate Analysis
The results of the multivariate regression analysis are presented in Table 4, which is 
based on the regression specification elaborated in Section 3.3. The columns are titled as 
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Model 1 and Model 2 for the alternative earnings quality measures: AbsExD&D (the 
Expanded D&D Model based earnings quality measure) and AbsDACJ (absolute value of the 
discretionary accruals derived from Modified Jones Model), respectively. 
Table 4: Multivariate Regression Analysis
Model 1: Dependent variable: AbsExD&D Model 2:Dependent variable: AbsDACJ 
Predicted
Sign Coefficient Std. Error t-value p-value Coefficient Std. Error t-value p-value
AccExDum – -0.0168 0.0096 -1.7473 0.0856 -0.0397* 0.0165 -2.411 0.0189
LnTA ? -0.0012 0.0022 -0.5367 0.5934 -0.0103** 0.0038 -2.6755 0.0095
EBEI ? 0.2155** 0.0628 3.4312 0.0011 0.3092** 0.1054 2.9340 0.0047
Lever ? 0.0002 0.0171 0.0117 0.9907 0.0116 0.0344 0.3375 0.7369
LossDum ? 0.0443** 0.0108 4.0921 0.0001 0.0474* 0.0186 2.5503 0.0132
ToBRD – 0.0001 0.0037 0.0269 0.9786 0.0041 0.0038 1.0809 0.2839
ToOutRto – 0.0005 0.0003 1.4775 0.1447 0.0011* 0.0005 2.0714 0.0425
AcOutRto – -0.0004 0.0003 -1.2142 0.2293 -0.0012* 0.0005 -2.3372 0.0227
AcToDir – -0.0017 0.0042 -0.4039 0.6877 -0.0036 0.0071 -0.5085 0.6129
FrgnRto – 0.0004 0.0002 1.7562 0.0841 0.0008* 0.0004 2.1144 0.0385
EmpRto – -0.0061 0.0032 -1.9019 0.0619 -0.0105 0.0052 -1.9202 0.0594
MbRto – 0.0001 0.0008 0.1277 0.8988 0.0013 0.0017 0.7441 0.4596
Constant ? 0.0641 0.0422 1.5177 0.1342 0.1565* 0.0726 2.1546 0.0351
n 91 92
Adj.R-squared 0.3673 0.3083
Model F-value 2.8019 2.3984
Model p-value 0.0004 0.002
The table indicates the findings of the regression analysis based on the regression specification in Section 3.3 
(coefficients of the sector and period dummy variables are not shown). In the columns titled: Model 1, the 
regression estimates of the dependent earnings quality measure: AbsExD&D are indicated, while in the columns 
of Model 2, the regression estimates of the dependent earnings quality measure: AbsDACJ are indicated. 
Definitions of the variables are indicated in Section 3.2 and 3.3.
* Significant at 5%  ** Significant at 1%
The expected negative signs are observed in the coefficients of AccExDum (i.e., dummy 
variable representing accounting expertise of outside directors) under both Model 1 and 
Model 2.[13] Under Model 1, the association between AccExDum and AbsExD&D is observed 
to be weak (p<.10). On the other hand, under Model 2, the association between AccExDum 
and AbsDACJ is observed to be comparatively strong (p<.05). Hence, the multivariate results 
may indicate that availability of outside directors with accounting expertise is more effective in 
enhancing earnings quality by curtailing earnings management (i.e., by reducing discretionary 
accruals: AbsDACJ), in comparison to improving earnings quality via enhancing the overall 
accruals quality (i.e., reducing the errors in mapping pertaining to total accruals: AbsExD&D). 
[16] This finding is quite interesting as Ebihara and Ajward (2011) find mixed evidence between 
earnings quality (i.e., by using accruals and cash flow predictability based proxies) and 
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accounting expertise of outside directors, using an overall sample of all listed firms in Japan. 
Further in another study (Ajward, 2011), the author finds that mere existence of an audit 
committee is insufficient in enhancing earnings quality. Therefore, the particular committee 
system environment (i.e., especially with the presence of an audit committee) combined with 
the accounting expertise of outside directors is observed to be having a positive influence over 
the earnings quality as per the findings of this study. 
The statistical significances observed in the above analyses, however, is not as high as 
compared to Lin and Hwang (2010). Section 4.3 that succeeds discusses possible reasons for 
such lesser significances observed in this section.[17] 
4.3 Discussion
The Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) strongly opposed in allowing 
outside directors under the proposed revisions of the Commercial Code due to the possibility 
that outside directors may not be able to execute a useful function in the highly relational 
Japanese corporate affairs (Saito, 2009). Therefore, this reason might have played a key role in 
diminishing the effectiveness of monitoring the financial affairs by the outside directors 
possessing accounting expertise in enhancing quality of earnings. Although there might be a 
positive influence on overall corporate performance (Saito, 2009; Bebenrotha & Donghaob 
2007), the highly relational atmosphere could impair the effective monitoring role of the 
outside directors (despite possessing financial expertise) of much more sophisticated financial 
dimension as monitoring of the internal control and thus improvement in the earnings quality.   
In addition to the above key possibility and apart from the possible influence of an 
inherently restricted sample, the survey of the Japan Corporate Auditors Association (JCAA, 
2004) indicates that the objectives of setting up and the functioning of the audit committees 
may be different from their objectives and functions expected in the Anglo-American context. 
In that survey, out of the 936 listed companies that responded, only 1.7% have either 
established or considered to establish the committee system. Further, out of the firms that 
had already implemented the committee system, only 21.4% indicated that the audit 
committees could be considered superior to the traditional corporate auditor system for 
monitoring. Out of the firms that rejected the audit committee system, 41.8% believed that 
conventional auditor system is very suitable for their contexts. Furthermore, the descriptive 
statistics tabulated in Tables 1 in Section 4.1 indicates that the foreign ownership (FrgnRto) is 
observed to be approximately 21%. A curious question may be posed as whether these reforms 
were made merely to satisfy or to attract such investors. 
Accounting Expertise of Outside Directors and Earnings Quality within the Context of the Committee System: An Empirical Analysis
— 221 —
These concerns may call for more in-depth case study nature of research to investigate 
the real function of outside directors as well as an examination of genuine objectives, 
resources allocated and other important characteristics pertaining to audit committees. 
Further intimate details such as the number of meeting held, contribution by each director, 
motivation for such contribution, authority, the duration of committee meetings, the charter of 
the audit committee, etc., may need to be investigated in-depth. 
The next section presents robustness tests and additional tests for the current study.
5.   Robustness and Additional Tests
5.1 Regressing via Non-parametric Bootstrap procedure
In Section 4.1, it is noted that the sample sizes for both Expanded D&D Model sample 
and the Modified Jones Model sample are inherently restricted, which could raise a concern 
over the assumption on the normality of residuals in performing the respective regression 
analyses in Section 4.2. Therefore, in order to overcome this possible concern, the multivariate 
regression analysis (Section 3.3) is subjected to the non-parametric bootstrap procedure 
(Efron, 1981, Dichev & Tang, 2009). The results are outlined in Table 5 below for the 
AccExDum variable (the details of the other control variables are not shown).
Table 5: Bootstrapping the Multivariate Regression 
n
No. of 
replications
Observed 
coefficient
Bootstrap 
Standard 
Error
z-value p>|z|
Corrected
Confidence
Intervals 
Lower 
bound
Upper 
bound
AccExDum
(AbsExD&D as 
dependent variable)
91 35,835 -0.0168 0.0120 -1.3957 0.1628 -0.0452 0.0037
AccExDum
(AbsDACJ as 
dependent variable)
92 35,930 -0.0397 0.0195 -2.0343 0.0419 -0.0804 -0.0031
This table depicts the findings for the AccExDum (i.e., the existence of outside director with accounting expertise 
in the board) variable by bootstrapping (non-parametric) the multivariate regression specification in Section 3.3: 
Eqn.1, for both alternative earnings quality measures: AbsExD&D and AbsDACJ. (The table depicts only the 
coefficients for the AccExDum variable. The coefficients of the other control variables are not depicted.)
Definitions of the variables are indicated in Section 3.2 and 3.3.
n represents the firm-years under both Expanded D&D Model sample and Modified Jones Model sample.
It is observed that the weak relation observed in Section 4.2 on the Expanded D&D 
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Model based earnings quality measure (AbsExD&D) and the presence of outside director(s) 
having accounting expertise (AccExDum) has become insignificant (see p>|z|). On the other 
hand, the relation between the Modified Jones Model based proxy measure: AbsDACJ and 
AccExDum is yet significant at p<.05. These results again imply that presence of outside 
directors with accounting expertise would be effective in reducing earnings management. To 
ensure the robustness of this inference the next sub-section elaborates an additional test. 
5.2 Application of CFO Modified Jones Model
In order to ensure that the results are not dependent on a particular earnings 
management proxy model (i.e., Modified Jones Model), and thereby to ensure the robustness, 
the CFO Modified Jones Model (Kasznik, 1999) is used, which is also a model being applied 
on Japanese data (see Kubota, Suda & Takehara, 2010).[18] In order to investigate the 
association between accounting expertise of outside directors and the measure based on the 
CFO Modified Jones Model: AbsCfoDACJ (see endnote 18 for derivation for this proxy 
measure), the multivariate regression specification in Section 3.3 is used (all control variables 
are the same). The findings are presented in Table 6 below.
Table 6: Multivariate Regression Analysis 
Model 3: Dependent variable: AbsCfoDACJ
Predicted
Sign Coefficient Std. Error t-value p-value
AccExDum – -0.0223 0.0127 -1.7622 0.0830
LnTA ? -0.0086** 0.0029 -2.9206 0.0049
EBEI ? 0.3507** 0.0812 4.3213 0.0001
Lever ? 0.0243 0.0264 0.9196 0.3614
LossDum ? 0.0650** 0.0143 4.5398 0.0000
ToBRD – 0.0014 0.0029 0.4827 0.6310
ToOutRto – 0.0010* 0.0004 2.3551 0.0217
AcOutRto – -0.0010* 0.0004 -2.4268 0.0182
AcToDir – -0.0080 0.0055 -1.4506 0.1519
FrgnRto – 0.0006* 0.0003 2.1272 0.0374
EmpRto – -0.0054 0.0039 -1.2792 0.2056
MbRto – 0.0014 0.0014 0.9963 0.323
Constant ? 0.1529** 0.0559 2.7335 0.0082
n 92
Adj.R-squared 0.4841
Model F-value 3.9449
Model p-value 0.0000 
This table indicates the results of the additional regression analysis proposed under 
Section 5.3 (coefficients of the sector and period dummy variables are not shown). In 
the columns titled: Model 3, the regression estimates for the dependent earnings 
quality measure: AbsCfoDACJ are indicated. Definitions of the variables are indicated 
in Section 3.2 and 3.3.
* Significant at 5%  ** Significant at 1%  
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The findings again indicate the expected negative sign (for the same reason as indicated 
in endnote 13 and 15) in the relation between the presence of outside director(s) with 
accounting expertise (AccExDum) and CFO Modified Jones Model based earnings quality 
proxy: AbsCfoDACJ. Since the p<.10, the positive association is weak, however (see the 
discussion in Section 4.3 for reasons). The next section illustrates the results on the issue of 
endogeneity. 
5.3 Endogeneity and Reverse Causality 
Another general concern, which might be aggravated by using an inherently restricted 
sample, is the issue of reverse causality espoused by endogeneity. The overwhelming 
theoretical and empirical evidence support the causality hypothesized under the current study 
(Section 2.2 and 2.3) that outside directors with accounting expertise in firms that have 
established the audit committees, enhances the quality of earnings via better monitoring. Due 
to the restricted sample, however, there might be a concern over the issue of endogeneity, and 
therefore of the reverse causality pertaining to the main independent variable considered in 
this study (i.e., AccExDum). Thus, endogeneity is tested using instrumental variable 
regression –IV Regression– diagnostics (Larcker & Rusticus, 2009; Baum, Schaffer & Stillman, 
2003; 2010).[19] The diagnostic results are indicated in Table 7.
Table 7: Endogeneity Diagnostics
Sam
ple
Instrumented Variable Excluded Instruments Included 
Instruments 
in testingInstrument 
C
statistic
Chi-sq(2) 
p-value Instruments
Sargan 
statistic
Chi-sq(2) 
p-value
Expanded D&D
M
odel
AccExDum
1.1130 0.2915
InsRto, 
CeoRto
1.7890 0.4089
LnTA,
EBEI,
Lever, 
LossDum, 
ToBRD, 
ToOutRto, 
AcOutRto, 
AcToDir, 
FrgnRto, 
EmpRto, 
MbRto, 
Σγi SecDumi,t
ΣδnYrDumn,t
M
odified Jones
M
odel 
1.4300 0.2318 1.4400 0.4866 
The above table shows the results of the instrumental variable regression (i.e., IV Regression) diagnostics in 
establishing the exogeneity of the instrumented variable: AccExDum, for both Expanded D&D Model sample and 
Modified Jones Model sample. As required by IV Regression diagnostics, two additional exogenous variables are 
introduced InsRto and CeoRto (see endnote 19 for definitions). Definitions of the other variables are indicated in 
Section 3.2 and 3.3.
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The C-statistic (also known as the GMM distance or difference-in-Sargan statistic) is the 
test for the exogeneity of the instrumented variable (Baum et al., 2010). The null hypothesis of 
this test is that the instrument is valid (i.e., exogenous). As indicated in Table 7, since the 
p-value of the C-statistic is well above the 5% threshold, the instrumented variable: AccExDum 
is tested to be valid and exogenous under this test (further, based on the p-value of Sargan-
statistic test, InsRto and CeoRto are also noted to be, in fact, exogenous as suggested in the 
extant literature). Therefore, the issue of reverse causality in the context of this research is not 
seen as a concern for AccExDum variable as it is not inundated with endogeneity.
6.   Conclusion, Limitations and Future Directions
6.1 Summary and Conclusion
Contemporary corporate governance reforms in Japan have introduced several new 
governance mechanisms as the introduction of outside directors, implementation of the 
committee system and reduction of board sizes. The local extant research is highly 
concentrated in evaluating the effectiveness of these reforms in terms of corporate 
performance and stock market performance. Only few studies that use financial accounting 
related bases such as financial reporting integrity, earnings quality, and disclosure quality are 
noted. The limited number of financial accounting related local studies, however, has mixed 
evidence. For the purpose of this study, the quality of earnings has been selected due to 
earnings being one of the key criterion used by investors and other stakeholders in making 
informed economic decisions, and thus, the quality of earnings is observed to be of paramount 
importance.[1]  
Thus, in this research, an attempt was made to establish the association between 
earnings quality and the outside directors possessing accounting expertise for firms having 
audit committees, in the context of firms listed in the Tokyo Stock Exchange (First and 
Second sections) for the period: 2006-2008 by following a distinct research design. Having an 
audit committee as an important basis (i.e., environment), the independence espoused by 
being an “outside” director and highly strengthened by having “accounting” expertise (in the 
board as well as in an audit committee) are factors believed to jointly enhance the financial 
reporting function (and thereby earnings quality) via effective financial monitoring. Based on 
this argument, a strong positive association is expected between the earnings quality and 
outside directors with financial expertise (for firms having the committee system). This is an 
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important aspect to investigate as extant research studies do not find that merely having 
outside directors or expertise per se improve earnings quality (Lin & Hwang, 2010; Ajward, 
2011). 
In terms of research design, this research study addresses a concern over the extant 
research studies by taking into account the accounting expertise not only in the audit 
committee itself, but also the accounting expertise in the board. Under the main analyses of 
this study, earnings quality is proxied by two well-established and used accruals quality proxy 
models, i.e., an expanded version of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model and the Modified 
Jones Model (Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney, 1995). Furthermore, in terms to proxy accounting 
expertise, the experience in accounting of an outside director in the field of accounting is 
used.
Concerning the findings, the multivariate regression analysis (Section 4.2) supports the 
expected positive association between the presence of outside directors with accounting 
expertise and earnings quality for firms that have audit committees, when earnings quality is 
measured using the Modified Jones Model (Table 4: Model 2). The expected positive 
relation, however, becomes weaker between them, when earnings quality is proxied using the 
expanded version of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model (i.e., Expanded D&D Model) –
Table 4: Model 1. These finding may suggest that the presence of outside directors with 
accounting expertise is more effective in enhancing the earnings quality via reducing earnings 
management (i.e., reducing discretionary accruals) rather than by improving the overall 
accruals quality by reducing accruals estimation errors.[16] The additional tests (in Section 5.1 
and 5.2), indicate that the significance levels of the relations observed under Section 4.2 is 
subject to deterioration. In contrast, in the international context, Lin and Hwang (2010), in 
their meta-analysis find the observed positive relations highly significant (p<0.01) using 
accrual based proxies. In the Japanese context, although not directly comparable in terms of 
the methodology and sample, but the only study available that has similarities within the local 
extant literature, Ebihara and Ajward (2010) find mixed evidence on the relation between 
outside directors having accounting expertise and earnings quality proxies (i.e., accruals and 
cash flow predictability based proxies). On the other hand, using corporate performance 
proxies (in contrast to earnings quality proxies used in this study), extant local studies: Saito 
(2009); Bebenrotha and Donghaob (2007), in overall, indicate that the selected corporate 
governance aspects more or less have a significant positive influence over corporate 
performance. Thus, in investigating possible reasons for the observed lesser statistical 
significance in this study, highly relational atmosphere that may prevent effective functioning 
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of outside directors (despite having accounting expertise) as monitors in more sophisticated 
financial dimension as monitoring of the internal control system; the possibility that the 
objective and function of audit committees may be different from the Anglo-American 
counterparts, are noted (Section 4.3). 
While contributing to the limited number of accounting research literature on the 
selected theme, this research may raise concerns on the establishment of audit committees 
and deployment of suitable outside directors with appropriate expertise. The function of 
outside directors with accounting expertise, the genuine objective of the establishment of the 
audit committees and the adequacy of directors being merely “independent”, may need to be 
taken into further consideration in policymaking.
6.2 Limitations and Future Research Directions
The findings of this study as well as the conclusions reach thereon should be interpreted 
subject to following caveats. The study used an inherently restricted sample of firms that had 
established audit committees. Therefore, the generalization of the findings should be done 
with caution. Further, as per future research directions, it is suggested to use a wide variety of 
proxies that goes beyond accruals quality to operationalize earnings quality. Finally, as noted 
in Section 4.3, in-depth case study nature of studies are called for that consider more intimate 
dimensions in evaluating their effectiveness in enhancing financial the reporting function and 
earnings quality.  
[Notes]
[1] Further, Ewert and Wagenhofer (2010) explain that earnings quality is one of the most significant features 
of financial reporting systems. They further elaborate that higher quality of earnings enhances capital 
market ef ficiency, and thus investors and other stakeholders seek for higher quality accounting 
information in making their decisions. Moreover, it is noted that earnings is observed to be the most 
commonly used financial statement element in corporate fraud, which reemphasizes the importance to 
investigate and ensure quality of earnings.
[2] This research takes in to account only the firms that have adopted the committee system as its sample and 
performs subsequent analyses on them. Apart from the importance of an audit committee as a key 
accounting and auditing related monitoring mechanism, this specific sample selection procedure is due to 
the necessity to bring as much as possible the analytical comparisons within a homogeneous corporate 
governance environment (i.e., firms having implemented the committee system). Further, Ebihara and 
Ajward (2011) find mixed evidence between accounting expertise and earnings quality proxies (i.e., 
accruals and cash flow predictability based proxies) by pooling all listed firms in Japan, which may be 
attributed to the difference in governance systems (i.e., the absence in the homogeneity in the corporate 
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governance system). 
[3] The author deeply appreciates and acknowledges Assoc. Prof. Takashi Ebihara for painstakingly compiling 
the expertise database and permitting the database to be used in this research.  
[4] The observations thus excluded were examined for the concern that a systematic pattern exists on the 
excluded firm-year observations (as survival bias), and such a systematic pattern is not observed. 
[5] Where applicable, standardization of variables is performed using the simple average of the total assets as 
per the extant literature.
[6] The cross-sectional versions of the Expanded D&D Model and the Modified Jones Model (instead of the 
time-series versions) are used to minimize the effects of the firm-specific economic fluctuations that had 
taken place during the research period (see Baxter & Cotter, 2009). Further, it limits the possibility of 
introducing survival bias, as the time-series versions require consecutive financial data for the estimation 
of the respective earnings quality measures.
[7] In estimating the cross-sectional estimates, a 24-item original version of the sector classification (which is 
based on the Tokyo Stock Exchange classification) that is used in Kubota, Suda and Takehara (2010) is 
utilized under this study. This original classification merges similar sectors and removes banking 
corporations, insurance companies and other financial institutions due to significant differences in financial 
statements and highly regulated industries.
[8] As per the extant literature, in order to ensure that the findings of this study is not inundated with outliers 
and thereby to enhance the robustness, all of the earnings quality proxies used in this study are 
winsorized at 5% and 95% percentiles (see Hazarika, Karpoff & Nahata, 2011; Yu, 2010).  
[9] Extant research has used different experience categorization schemes to classify the experience of outside 
directors in the context of an audit committee. In this research, the presence of outside directors having 
accounting expertise is used as the main independent variable (Section 3.3). Experience in other expertise 
categories (as law, banking, tax, finance, etc.) are seen as having little relevance in enhancing accrual 
quality, as such enhancement requires deep knowledge in the financial accounting procedures and 
reporting process. This inference is affirmed in the study of Ebihara and Ajward (2011), which uses all 
expertise categories for all listed firms in Japan (see endnote 2). Further, an additional test performed to 
investigate the relevance of other expertise categories using the main regression analysis of this research 
(Section 3.3) did not indicate any significance over the accruals based earnings quality proxies (results not 
tabulated). 
[10] The control variables (i.e., governance and financial) are decided based on extant literature (Lin & Hwang, 
2010; Dhaliwal et al., 2006) and relevancy to the Japanese corporate context. Since many variables are 
involved, in order to investigate the multicollinearity issue, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) analysis was 
performed, and the sum of VIF factors is observed to be below of the acceptable level of 10 (se Krishnan & 
Lee, 2009).  
[11] Saito (2009) explains that the introduction of an outside director to a board that do not have outside 
directors at all (i.e., all insider boards), has a significant impact in terms of performance compared to 
introducing an outside director to a board already having such directors. He finds that the marginal impact 
on performance of such introductions diminishes. He indicates that even a minority of outside directors 
could have a significant influence over curtailing managerial opportunism by drawing inferences from 
dictatorship games in game theory. In the same token, in this study, the dummy variable for accounting 
expertise (AccExDum) represents having at least one outside director with accounting expertise either in 
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the audit committee or in the board is believed to cause significant impact on the improvement of earnings 
quality.   
[12] In order to address the heteroskedastic effects and skewed nature of average total assets data, the natural 
logarithm of the average total assets is used.
[13] As discussed at the end of Section 3.2.2, higher magnitudes of both the Expanded D&D Model based 
proxy measure: AbsExD&D, and the Modified Jones Model based proxy measure: AbsDACJ, denote lower 
quality of earnings due to the higher magnitude of mapping errors in the accruals (AbsExD&D) and the 
higher discretionary accruals (AbsDACJ), respectively. Therefore, a negative sign is predicted depicting a 
positive relation between earnings quality and the accounting expertise of outside director dummy 
variable (AccExDum), for firms that had established audit committees.
[14] Further, in the case of the Expanded D&D Model sample and Modified Jones Model sample, the 
comparison of LnTA and EBEI values for firms having outside directors with accounting expertise 
(AccExDum = “1”) and without (AccExDum = “0”) is without extreme differences, which is expected to 
render a fair comparison.
[15] As noted under endnote 13 above, higher magnitudes of AbsExD&D denotes poor earnings quality.
[16] Although not directly comparable to this study, similar to this finding, Baxter and Cotter (2009) find that 
introduction of audit committees in Australia had reduced the earnings management dimension rather 
than improvement of the overall accruals quality using similar accrual based earnings quality proxies.
[17] These lesser significances are further asserted by additional sensitivity tests indicated under Section 5.1 
and 5.2.
[18] Further, this particular model is used, as Kasznik (1999) observes that the findings of Dechow (1994) 
indicate the changes in the cash flows are negatively related with the total accruals and thus should be 
considered in deriving the discretionary accruals. Thus, by using the same procedure explained in Section 
3.2.2 in obtaining the AbsDACJ earnings quality proxy measure, the new measure: AbsCfoDACJ is 
estimated on a cross-sectional basis by using Eqn. d below (see endnotes 6, 7 and 8, which are also 
applicable in estimating this measure).
 TACCt = α 0 + β 1Δ ADJREVt + β 2PPEt + β 3ΔCFOt + ε t Eqn. d
[19] In the language of instrumental variables, instrumented variable is the variable that is subjected to testing 
for endogeneity (i.e., AccExDum under this study). Excluded instruments are the instruments that are 
exogenous, and in this research (as required by the diagnostics) two additional exogenous variables (that 
have been established in extant research as exogenous) are used in the IV regression diagnostics. They 
are Institutional ownership in equity (ratio) expressed in percentage at period t, which is denoted as 
InsRto, and the equity ownership (ratio) by Chief Executive Officer at period t (expressed in percentage), 
which is denoted as CeoRto. Finally, in the terminology, the included instruments are all the control 
variables used under the OLS regression analyses (Section 3.3)
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